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An Interpretation of the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
Concerning Personal Service in Japan
I. INTRODUCTION
Japanese imports constitute a large part of the total merchandise
imported by the United States.' Commercial litigation between
Japanese defendants and American plaintiffs, therefore, is inevitable
and has increased proportionately with the increase in Japanese im-
ports. Because service of process is an integral part of the American
civil litigation system, it is important to develop an effective method
to serve a Japanese defendant.
This comment explores the applicability of the Convention on
the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters 2 (Hague Convention) to the domestic laws of
Japan and the United States. Both federal and state laws related to
service of process abroad will be analyzed. However, since California
is the only state which has interpreted the Convention, only the law
of California will be considered.3
1. In 1980, the United States imported $30.7 billion worth of merchandise from Japan,
constituting 12.75% of total U.S. imports. This amount was second only to Canada, which
provided imports of $41.5 billion. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1981 at 846, 848 (102d ed. 1981). See also Report of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations on the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents, S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 12, 1967) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT], which indicates the timeliness of the Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, opened for signature Nov. 15,
1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter cited as the Hague Convention],
"[gliven the continually increasing volume of American travel abroad, especially in Europe,
of international business transactions land] of U.S. investment abroad... . Id. at 6.
2. The Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 361. For a general overview of the Conven-
tion. see Graveson. The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International
Law, 14 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 528. 538-41 (1965).
3. Since the requirements of personal jurisdiction are presumed satisfied, issues of
personal jurisdiction are beyond the scope of this comment. This is not an unreasonable
presumption since the typical situation where jurisdiction exists is when a Japanese defendant
causes a product to be put into the stream of commerce which is foreseeably imported by
an American company, causing injury in the United States. The difficulty lies in attempting
to serve the Japanese defendant. See Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d
808. 109 Cal.. Rptr. 402 (1973).
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II. UNITED STATES LAW CONCERNING SERVICE OF
PROCESS
The general requirements of service of process in the United
States were set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Milliken
v. Meyer:
4
[Adequate service,] so far as due process is concerned, is de-
pendent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided
for such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him
actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If
it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice...
implicit in due process are satisfied. 5
The Milliken requirements of service of process appear to be
applicable to service of process abroad. More importantly, however,
the purposes behind the Milliken requirements appear to have been
incorporated into the Hague Convention. For example, the treaty
states that it is designed to "ensure that judicial and extrajudicial
documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the
addressees in sufficient time ' 6 and to "improve the organization of
mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expe-
''7diting the procedure ....
The Hague Convention appears to be controlling on issues of
service of process abroad. However, the requirements of service of
process and the rationale behind those requirements as stated by Milliken
and applied to service of process abroad have been codified in federal
and state statutes. Hence, whether courts must follow the Hague
Convention or domestic law is an important issue.
4. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
5. Id. at 463.
6. the Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 362.
7. Id. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. Other purposes of the Con-
vention are set forth in the Report. For example:
I. "This convention is an important step toward the international codification
of a uniform law governing the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents
abroad." Id. at 3.
2. "[It] provides a high degree of assurance that if an American citizen in
the United States is sued in the courts of a state party to this treaty, he will be
notified of the suit in sufficient time to enable him to defend the action." Id. at
6 (statement of Richard Kearney).
3. "[lit gives to our people, whether litigating rights in State or Federal
courts, a very useful tool in furthering a fair determination of their rights, where
nationals of other contracting countries are involved, that would otherwise not be
available to them." Id. at 9 (statement of Joe Barrett).
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The answer is provided in the United States Constitution. The
supremacy clause of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 8
Because "[a] convention enjoys the status of a treaty as the 'supreme
Law of the Land,'" 9 the Hague Convention has the same force and
effect as a treaty under the supremacy clause, and would supersede
any domestic laws concerning service of process abroad.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention became effective in the United States on
February 10, 1969,10 and Japan adopted the Convention on July 27,
1970.11 Because Japan and the United States have not denounced the
Convention since its inception, it is automatically renewed every five
years. '
2
The Convention applies to all civil or commercial cases where
judicial or extrajudicial "documents" are required to be transmitted
for service abroad. For purposes of the Convention, the word "doc-
uments" does not denote "private documents of private individu-
als." 3 "Documents" are those items "emanating from authorities
and judicial officers of a state. . . .In U.S. practice,. . . it is intended
to include the official documents of administrative agencies and
commissions." '14
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
9. Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 78-79 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(citing American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957)).
10. The Hague Convention, 20 U.S.T. at 361.
11. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
12. The Convention provides in pertinent part:
The present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date of its
entry into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27, even for States
which have ratified it or acceded to it subsequently. If there has been no denun-
ciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five years.
The Hague Convention art. 30, 20 U.S.T. at 367.
13. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of Philip Amram).
14. Id. One commentator has also indicated that "the Convention does not intend to
effect [sic] the present system of letters rogatory." See Note, The Effect of the Hague
Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 131 (1969) (footnote omitted). See also infra
notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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The Convention also requires that the address of the party being
served be known. 15 Consequently, in a commercial case, for a Japanese
defendant to be served, his address must be known by the American
plaintiff. Where the address of the defendant is unknown, the Con-
vention does not apply, and apparently other methods such as service
by publication may be utilized.
A. Methods of Serving Documents
A Japanese defendant may be served in various ways under the
Convention. Article 2 provides that each contracting state shall des-
ignate a central authority which will receive requests for service from
other contracting states. 16 Japan has designated the Minister of Foreign
Affairs as its central authority and the United States has designated
the Departments of State and Justice as its central authorities. 17 Under
article 5(a), the central authority is to use the method, of service
which is normally used in that State for service of documents in
domestic actions against its own citizens. I8 Because all of the mem-
bers of the Hague Convention have methods of service of process
which comply with the Milliken requirements of due process, 19 the
central authority usually serves documents pursuant to article 5(a).
If there is any doubt, however, that the method of service may
not comply with due process, article 5(b) allows the applicant to
request a special method of service, provided that it is not incompatible
with the laws of the requesting State.20 Thus, a United States appli-
cant may demand that the defendant be personally served, or served
through an adult member of his family or through the person who is
in charge of his business.2' It is unlikely that such conventional meth-
ods which satisfy the Milliken requirements of due process would be
incompatible with local law,22 and hence, would qualify as a proper
15. The Hague Convention art. I. 20 U.S.T. at 362.
16. Id. art. 2, 20 U.S.T. at 362. It should be noted that the central authority is utilized
to effectuate service only, and should not concern itself with the merits of the litiga-
tion. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I, at 13 (statement of Philip Amram).
17. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I, at 13 (statement of Philip Amram);
see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
18. The Hague Convention art. 5(a). 20 U.S.T. at 362: see SENATE EXECUTIVE RE-
PORT, supra note I. at 13-14 (statement of Philip Amram).
19. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I. at 14 (statement of Philip Amram).
20. The Hague Convention art. 5(b), 20 U.S.T. at-362.
21. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I, at 14 (statement of Philip Amram).
22. Id.
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method of service under article 5(b).
The request by the applicant to the central authority for a special
method of service must be made by using the special forms annexed
to the Convention. 23 These forms require, inter alia, that the applicant
must furnish in duplicate the address of the party to be served, the
method of service requested under article 5, the nature and purpose
of the documents, the date, and the signature of the applicant. 24
The central authority may decline the request for service, but
may only do so on the following grounds: (1) the request does not
comply with the provisions of the Convention (e.g., the document is
not properly translated or the judicial forms are improperly filled out)25
or (2) compliance with the request would infringe upon the contracting
state's sovereignty or security.2 6 If the central authority declines the
request, it must promptly inform the applicant and state the reasons
for its objections. 27 Questions concerning these objections may then
be raised during diplomatic negotiations. 28
When a request is accepted by an applicant, the central authority
must fill out the special certificate which is annexed to the
Convention. 29 If service of process is completed, the central authority
must list the particulars of service, e.g., the method, place, date of
service, and the person to whom the document was delivered, on the
certificate.30 If service is not made, however, the central authority
must indicate in the certificate the reasons for failing to complete
service.31 The certificate is to be countersigned by the central au-
thority, or by a judicial authority, and forwarded directly to the
applicant.3
2
Use of the central authority is not obligatory,33 and several other
23. The Hague Convention art. 3, 20 U.S.T. at 362. The judicial forms are reprinted
at pages 81-82 of the 1983 Supplement to the Notes of the Advisory Committee for Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter cited as Rule 4 Advisory Committee
Notes].
24. Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes. supra note 23, at 81-82.
25. The Hague Convention art. 5, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
26. Id. art. 13, 20 U.S.T. at 364. See SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I. at
13 (statement of Philip Amram).
27. Id. art. 4, 20 U.S.T. at 362.
28. Id. art. 14, 20 U.S.T. at 364. See SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I. at
13 (statement of Philip Amram).
29. The Hague Convention art. 6, 20 U.S.T. at 363. See Rule 4 Advisory Committee
Notes. supra note 23, at 82.
30. Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes. supra note 23, at 82.
31. Id.
32. The Hague Convention art. 6, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
33. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Philip Amram).
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alternatives may be used under the Convention to effect service of
process. The central authority, however, may be thought of as a
safety valve, since it may always effect service if any of the afore-
mentioned alternatives fail.34 Documents may be served through dip-
lomatic or consular channels,3 5 by direct mail, 36 through judicial of-
ficers or other competent members of the State of destination,. 7 or by
any other means authorized by the domestic law of the state of
destination .38
B. Language Requirement
The Hague Convention contains language requirements for doc-
uments presented to be served. Article 7 indicates that the documents
may be translated in English, French, or in the official language of
the State in which the documents originate. 39 Article 5, however,
requires that if the documents are served through the central authority,
they may be required to be translated into the official language of the
State of destination .40
C. Default Judgments
Prior to the Hague Convention, notification au parquet systems
existed in many fQreign countries. 41 Under such systems, a foreign
plaintiff would serve the summons and complaint on a local foreign
official. 42 The time for the domestic defendant to answer would then
begin to run immediately after the local foreign official was
served. 43 The local official was then supposed to notify the defendant,
but failure to do so would have no effect on the validity of ser-
vice. Thus, a default judgment could be entered against the defendant
without affording the defendant adequate notice. a"
Article 15, however, prevents this problem by requiring the plain-
34. Id.
35. The Hague Convention art. 8, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
36. Id. art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363.
37. Id. art. 10(b), 20 U.S.T. at 363.
38. Id. art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365.
39. Id. art. 7, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
40. Id. art. 5, 20 U.S.T. at 362. For instance, the United States Department of State
requires an English translation to accompany any documents sent to it. See SENATE EXECUTIVE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
41. Note, supra note 14, at 129-30.
42. Id. See SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-12 (statement of Philip
Amram).
43. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I, at I 1-12 (statement of Philip Amram).
44. Id.
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tiff to prove certain facts before a default judgment is entered against
the defendant. The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the foreign defen-
dant was served in sufficient time to permit him to defend the action,
and that he was served either under his own law or under the provisions
of the Convention; or (2) an effort was made to serve him under the
Convention, that at least six months had elapsed, and that no report
had been received as to whether he was served despite "reasonable
effort." ,4
5
Article 16 further expands this protection of defendants against
"un-noticed" default judgments by allowing the judge who entered
the default judgment to reopen the judgment within one year or more
after the date the judgment was entered. The judge may exercise this
discretion if the defendant has a prima facie defense on the merits
and has acted promptly upon learning of the judgment. 46
Consequently, articles 15 and 16 taken together guarantee a de-
fendant who was never actually served a minimum of eighteen months
from the date of judgment to move to protect his interests. 47 Hence,
even if the procedures of notification au parquet are valid under the
Convention, 48 the defendant is nonetheless protected by other provi-
sions of the Convention.
D. Japanese Reservations
Japan has made the following reservations with respect to the
Hague Convention:
(1) The only authorized agent for service in Japan is the Minister
of Foreign Affairs who is designated as the central authority
as well as the diplomatic or consular agent. 49
(2) The district court which has rendered judicial aid with respect
to service is designated as the authority competent to complete
45. The Hague Convention art. 15, 20 U.S.T. at 364; SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Philip Amram). For an analysis of the possible conflict
between articles 10 and 15 of the Convention, see Note, supra note 14, at 139-40.
46. The Hague Convention art. 16, 20 U.S.T. at 364-65.
47. See SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Philip Amram).
48. "It is interesting to note that notification au parquet is still probably a valid
method of service under the Convention, providing the state of destination does not
object." Note, supra note 14, at 134.
49. Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 23, at 86. The Consular Con-
vention, Mar. 22, 1963, United States-Japan, art. 17(i)(3), 15 U.S.T. 768, 795, T.I.A.S.
No. 5602, indicates that a consular officer may serve judicial documents on behalf of the
courts of the sending state. However, this treaty, which came into effect in 1963, appears
to be abrogated by these reservations to the Hague Convention, which came into effect after
1970. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
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the certificate of service. 50
(3) Japan expressly objects to article 10(b) which provides that
service may be made through judicial officers or other com-
petent persons of the state of origin, directly through judicial
officers or other competent persons of the state of destination.5"
(4) Japan expressly objects to article 10(c) which provides that
service may be made by a person interested in a judicial
proceeding directly through judicial officers or competent
persons of the state of destination.52
By limiting the central authority to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and by not allowing any other judicial or consular officials to effectuate
service, Japan has effectively eliminated the use of notification au
parquet by a Japanese plaintiff.53 This result exists because Japan
has objected to article 10(b) and, therefore, a Japanese plaintiff can
no longer use local Japanese officials in the State of origin to effect
service .4
IV. THE DOMESTIC LAW OF JAPAN
The Japanese Code of Civil Procedure states in article 161 that
judicial documents shall be administered by the court clerk. 5 It fur-
ther indicates in article 172 that the court clerk may dispatch docu-
ments by registered mail.5 6 Article 175 provides that service in a
foreign country shall be made to the presiding judge or Japanese
official .57
Article 19 of the Hague Convention expressly states that to the
extent that the internal laws of the contracting state permit other forms
of service, the Convention will not affect such provi-
sions.5 8 Moreover, articles 559 and 1560 explicitly provide for the use
of the internal law of the contracting state. Nonetheless, because
Japan has objected to the use of article 10, subparagraphs (b) and
50. Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 23. at 86.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The Milliken requirements of due process in the United States dictate that noti-
fication au parquet procedures may not be used by an American plaintiff. See SENATE
EXECUTIVE REPORT. supra note I. at 15 (statement of Philip Amram).
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. MINJI sosHO HO (Code of Civil Procedure). Law No. 29 of 1890.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Hague Convention art. 19. 20 U.S.T. at 365.
59. Id. art. 5. 20 U.S.T. at 362.
60. Id. art. 15, 20 U.S.T. at 364.
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(c), 6' which allow documents to be sent or received by judicial of-
ficials, it would appear that the Hague Convention has preempted the
internal law of Japan. 62 As such, when documents are transmitted to
or from Japan, the applicant need only comply with the Hague Con-
vention-and there is no necessity to look to the internal law of Japan.
V. UNITED STATES STATUTES CONCERNING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
service on a foreign defendant may be made:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country
for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of
general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in
response to a letter rogatory, when service in either case is rea-
sonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon an individual,
by delivery to him personally, and upon a corporation or part-
nership or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or
general agent; or (D) by any form of mail, requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court
of the party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court.
63
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) and the Hague Convention
appear to agree that service on a Japanese defendant may be made:
(1) directly on the Japanese court clerk, as provided by Japanese
law;64 (2) by delivery of documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs;
or, (3) by direct mail. Rule 4(i), however, allows personal service
or service by an order of the court-methods which are not provided
by the Convention.
The conflicts between Rule 4(i) and the Hague Convention seem
to be resolved by the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution 65 which provides that a treaty shall be the supreme law
of the land. Furthermore, when congressional legislation is incon-
sistent with a treaty, the United States Supreme Court, as early as
61. Id. art. 10, 20 U.S.T. at 363.
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). The difficulties inherent in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which gave rise to the Hague Convention have been documented. See Jones,
International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform. 62 YALE
L.J. 515, 534-38 (1953); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 1031, 1032-43 (1961).
64. The internal law of Japan may have been abrogated by the Hague Convention. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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1889, stated that "[t]he last expression of the sovereign will must
control. "66 The Hague Convention was ratified in 1969,67 six years
after Rule 4(i) was amended68 and, therefore, would appear to preempt
Rule 4(i).69
At first blush, the foregoing analysis seems correct. However,
the legislative history70 and article 19 of the Convention mandate a
contrary result. The Senate Executive Report indicates "nothing now
authorized by our law will be repealed or modified in the event of
ratification of this convention by the United States." 7' The testimony
of Richard Kearney, then Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department
of State, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also
supports this view. In his testimony, Kearney discussed the liberal
methods of serving process under Rule 4(i) and stated that the Judicial
Conference of the United States has endorsed the treaty as being in
accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 72
Article 19 also indicates that the Convention does not preempt
Rule 4(i). Article 19 provides: "To the extent that the internal law
of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than
those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents coming
from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention
shall not affect such provisions." ' 73 Moreover, Philip Amram, the
principal American spokesman at the Hague Conference, 74 testified
before the Senate Committee that article 19 "makes it clear that the
convention is an enabling convention, designed to create benefits
66. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
67. The Hague Convention went into effect in the United States on February 10,
1969. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68. See Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 23, at 67-69.
69. Moreover, one commentator has noted that when the defendant's address is known,
"It]he Hague Convention, through the supremacy clause, supersedes all state and federal
methods of service abroad .... - Note, supra note 14, at 128.
70. A court "may look to the diplomatic and legislative history of a treaty to determine
its correct interpretation." Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943)).
71. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. At the time of the Hague
Conference:
a great deal of work had been carried on in the United States to establish modem
and practicable methods for service of process in cases involving foreign plaintiffs
or defendants. These efforts culminated in the revision of Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by the addition of section (i) ....
Id. at 6 (statement of Richard Keamey).
72. id. at 7 (statement of Richard Kearney).
73. The Hague Convention art. 19, 20 U.S.T. at 365.
74. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note I, at 5 (statement of Richard Kearney).
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where none now exist, and is not a restricting convention which
would, in any manner, limit the existing or future procedures in any
signatory state if they are more liberal than the convention." 7 5
Notwithstanding the fact that the Convention does not preempt
Rule 4(i), a contrary result is reached when a Japanese defendant is
served. Because Japan has objected to subparagraphs (b) and (c) of
article 10,76 an American plaintiff can never serve a Japanese defen-
dant by serving judicial officers or other competent persons, even
though this method of service is permitted by Rule 4(i).
For example, suppose an American attorney personally serves a
Japanese defendant in Japan. The service is valid under the federal
rules, which expressly authorize personal service, and is also valid
under the Hague Convention, which does not provide for personal
service, but does not prevent other more liberal procedures such as
personal service. Even though Japan has expressly objected to article
10(c), the Hague Convention does not preclude the attorney from
personally serving the Japanese defendant, because service is not
effectuated through persons of the state of destination-Japan.
A literal interpretation of the treaty creates an anomalous result
when the American plaintiff decides to have a Japanese attorney serve
the Japanese defendant. Although this method of service complies
with Rule 4(i), the service would nonetheless be invalid because Japan
has expressly objected to article 10(c) which allows service by a
competent person living in Japan.
In comparing these two examples, it is difficult to believe that
the purpose of the treaty, that is, adequate notice,7 7 would be greatly
enhanced by having an American attorney rather than a Japanese
attorney, acting as the American attorney's agent, deliver the docu-
ments. For this reason, despite the literal wording of the treaty, and
because Japan has objected to article 10, subparagraphs (b) and (c),
presumably neither method of service would be allowed.
75. Id. at 14 (statement of Philip Amram) (emphasis in original). Several courts have
indicated that the Hague Convention "was not meant to abrogate the provisions of Rule 4,
as evidenced by the fact that there has been no change in the provisions of the Rule since
the treaty became effective." Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp.
1226, 1229 (N.D. 111. 1977) (citing Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412).
76. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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VI. FEDERAL CASES INTERPRETING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
Several federal courts have interpreted the Hague Convention.
In DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc. ,7 the district court found
that the Japanese defendant did not have sufficient contacts with the
state of New Jersey to support an assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion. 79 On appeal, the 'American plaintiff claimed that the Hague
Convention, combined with Rule 4, effects a "wholly federal means"
of service, and that the district court should have aggregated all of
the defendant's contacts with the United States (instead of merely
New Jersey) to support the assertion of jurisdiction.A0 The court of
appeals indicated that the purpose of the Convention was three-
fold: (1) to provide a consistent means of service abroad in different
nations so that American plaintiffs would not be faced with the cost-
prohibitive process of complying with state, federal and foreign coun-
try procedure for service of documents;8' (2) to allow American plain-
tiffs to serve a central authority rather than dealing with local officials
unfamiliar with procedure; 82 and, (3) to prevent an American defen-
dant from suffering a default judgment without ever having the op-
portunity to defend the claim. 83 The court then noted:
[Tihe purpose and nature of the treaty demonstrate that it does
not provide independent authorization for service of process in a
foreign country ....
By virtue of the supremacy clause the treaty overrides state
methods of service of process abroad that are objectionable to the
nation in which process is served. However, we do not believe
that the treaty in any way affects a state's chosen limits on the
jurisdictional reach of its court. If a state long-arm rule does not
authorize service outside the United States, a liti2ant in that state
would have no authority to invoke the methods of service of
process provided in the treaty. We believe that the treaty merely
serves as an important adjunct to state long-arm rules, and that it
specifies a valid method of service only if the state long-arm rule
authorizes service abroad.
78. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 286.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 287.
82. Id. at 287-88.
83. Id. at 288.
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[Tihe treaty is similar to rule 4(i) in that it provides a "man-
ner" of service to be used by a litigant with the requisite authority
to serve process. Were we to hold other wise [sic], we would
attribute to the Senate that ratified the treaty the intent to authorize
the equivalent of "world-wide" service of process in all federal-
question, admiralty and diversity cases while at the same time not
authorizing nationwide service of process for those same claims.1
4
Accordingly, the court found that mere compliance with the
Convention does not constitute service by "wholly federal means,"
and thus, because the defendant's contacts were insufficient to satisfy
the state long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction could not be as-
serted.8 5 Thus, under DeJames, the Hague Convention is not a "fed-
eral" long-arm statute, and independent authorization for asserting
personal jurisdiction must exist.
An Illinois district court also interpreted the Hague Convention
in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. 6 The defendant, a
Lebanese corporation, moved to quash service of summons when
service was effected by a court-appointed process server. 87 In denying
the motion, the court indicated that the service was sufficient pursuant
to article 10(b) of the Hague Convention which allows judicial officers
of the United States to serve judicial documents through competent
persons in foreign countries.8 8 The court also stated that there was
no indication that the defendant did not voluntarily accept process in
accordance with article 5.89 The difficulty with the court's conclusion
is that article 5 allows an addressee to accept documents voluntarily
only if they are first served through the central authority designated
for service of process. 90
If the fact pattern of Tamari were to arise with a Japanese de-
fendant, the motion to quash service would probably be successful
since the method of service used in Tamari would not be sufficient
for a Japanese defendant. 91 Further, it is doubtful whether a court
84. Id. at 288-89 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 290.
86. 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. III. 1977).
87. Id. at 1227.
88. Id. at 1229.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. It is questionable whether this point
is of any practical significance since it is probably the exception rather than the rule that a
foreign defendant will voluntarily accept the documents.
91. Japan has objected to article I 0(b) which deals with service of process by competent
persons in foreign countries. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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would allow article 5 to rescue the service of process, since Japan
has indicated that the only court-related official which can deliver
service to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily, is the central
authority, i.e., the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 92
Finally, in Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co.,93 without mentioning
the Hague Convention, a Florida district court indicated that the
requirements of service of process were satisfied where a Japanese
defendant's agent was personally served by mail pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1)(D). 94
VII. CALIFORNIA STATUTES CONCERNING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
The California Code of Civil Procedure authorizes service of
process abroad. Section 413.10 provides in pertinent part that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute a summons shall be served
... . [o]utside the United States as provided in this chapter
... .,,9 Section 415.30 falls within the same chapter as section
413.30 and allows a summons to be served by mail. 96 Section 415.40
further describes this type of service and allows an out-of-state person
to be served "by sending a copy of the summons and. . . complaint
to the person to be served by any form of airmail requiring a return
receipt. ' 97 Thus, California statutes allow service of judicial docu-
ments outside the United States if return-receipt type mail is used to
effect the service of such documents.
The California return-receipt method of service appears more
restrictive than the direct-mail method allowed by article 10(a) of the
Hague Convention. The Convention, however, was not intended to
preempt state law, and in fact, "does not invade the domain of State
law in the United States." 98 Hence, California law, rather than the
Hague Convention, dictates the method of service of process on for-
eign defendants.
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. However, as noted in the previous
two examples in the text, personal service by an American plaintiff may be sufficient.
93. 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
94. Id. at 840.
95. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 413.10 (Deering Supp. 1983).
96. Id. § 413.30.
97. Id. § 415.40.
98. SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Joe Barrett). See,
e.g.. The Hague Convention art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363.
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VIII. CALIFORNIA CASES INTERPRETING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court,99 provides an extensive
overview of the incorporation of the Hague Convention into the
California service of process statutes. At the outset the court states
that because of the supremacy clause, California "cannot attempt to
exercise jurisdiction if to do so would violate an international
treaty. ' 100 The court then confronted the issue whether service of
process could be directly mailed to a Japanese defendant.' 0 Here,
the American plaintiff complied with article 10(a) of the Hague Con-
vention by directly mailing service of process to the defendant. 10 2 The
court applied article 15(b), which allows a judgment to be entered
against a defendant, provided that "the document was actually de-
livered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided
for by this Convention.' °3 Article 10(a) is the other "method" re-
ferred to by the court.'04
The defendant in Shoei contended that the phrase "judicial doc-
uments" contained in article 10(a)'0 5 does not relate to service of
process because the Convention consistently refers to "service of
judicial documents" in other parts of the treaty, but refers to "send-
ing" judicial documents in article 10(a). '6 Consequently, the defen-
dant argued that article 10(a) merely authorizes the giving of notices
and the exchange of other judicial documents after service is effected
by some method other than direct mail. 0 7 The court, however, in-
dicated that the clause in article 10(a), "freedom to send judicial
documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad," 08 would
be superfluous unless it related to documents for service of process
purposes. o9 The court stated that if the defendant's interpretation of
the treaty was correct, Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
99. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
100. Id. at 819, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410. Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
102. Id. at 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
105. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of
"documents."
106. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
107. Id. at 820-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
108. Id. at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
109. Id.
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would be abrogated, a result clearly inappropriate. 10
The court also noted that the internal law of Japan permits service
from abroad by mail and, thus, the requirements of article 15(a) needed
to render judgment were fulfilled. I ' Moreover, the court indicated
that the subject judicial documents could be transmitted to Japan in
English because almost all Japanese companies involved in trade with
other countries are accustomed to receiving communications in
English." 2 Hence, the court concluded that direct mail may be used
to serve process on Japanese defendants in Japan." 3
IX. EVIDENCE OF SERVICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA LAW
California Code of Civil Procedure section 417.10 provides that,
"if service is made by mail pursuant to Section 415.30, proof of
service shall include the acknowledgment of receipt of summons in
the form provided by that section or other written acknowledgment
of receipt of summons satisfactory to the court."" 4  Rule 4(i)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "when service is
made pursuant to subparagraph (1)(D) of this subdivision, proof of
service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evi-
dence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court."" 5 Thus,
both the California statute and the Federal Rules appear to require a
signed receipt or other evidence to prove and validate service of
process.
Several California courts have interpreted California Code of
Civil Procedure section 417.10. In Stamps v. Superior Court, " 6 the
court found that where the service was airmailed and the return-receipt
was labeled "unclaimed," service of process was insufficient." 7 In
M. Lowenstein & Sons v. Superior Court,"18 the court indicated that
while a return receipt stating the date it was received by plaintiff's
counsel was defective, dismissal could be avoided by filing a copy
110. Id. at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 823, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
113. Id. The Shoei court left open the question of whether the Japanese defendant
could stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. Id. at 817 n.3, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.3.
1.14. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 417. 10 (Deering Supp. 1983). See supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 40)(2). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
116. 14 Cal. App. 3d 762, 92 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1971).
117. Id. at 762, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
118. 80 Cal. App. 3d 762, 145 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1978).
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of the defendant's acknowledgment of receipt of service and a dec-
laration of the secretary who mailed the service.' 19 Finally, in Shoei,' 20
the court recommended that where a defendant did not execute an
official acknowledgment of receipt, service would be sufficient if the




The following methods may be used to serve a Japanese defen-
dant residing in Japan:
(1) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be served which may
then serve the documents:
(a) by itself, or through an appropriate agency,
(b) by a method requested by the applicant, or
(c) by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily;
(2) by direct mail, or
(3) by any other means authorized by the domestic law of Japan.
If service is made through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
forms annexed to the Convention must be accurately completed. The
American plaintiff using this method should receive a certificate of
service from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Service may be effec-
tuated only through the Minister of Foreign Affairs and not through
judicial officials, diplomatic agents or other competent persons in
Japan.
The documents to be served may be written in English unless
the Minister of Foreign Affairs is utilized to serve process. In that
instance, the documents may be required to be translated into Japanese.
Under the Convention, Japanese defendants are guaranteed a
minimum of eighteen months to reopen a default judgment entered
against them. Generally, a signed return-receipt is needed as evidence
to prove that service was made.
United States cases and statutes interpreting the Hague Conven-
tion have resolved some conflicts between United States law and
certain provisions of the Convention. The provisions of Rule 4(i) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not preempted by the Hague
Convention. However, contrary to Rule 4(i), service may not be
made through the Japanese court clerk. Requirements of personal
119. Id.
120. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 823-24, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
121. Id. at 817-18, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
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jurisdiction are also not abrogated by the treaty. The DeJames de-
cision indicates that the Hague Convention may not be used as an
independent basis for asserting personal jurisdiction.
State case law, such as Shoei, indicates that the Convention
cannot preempt state law. Hence, in California, a Japanese defendant
may be served by direct mail with documents written in English.
The purposes of the Hague Convention are to make service of
process more efficient and to reduce the cost of service for an American
plaintiff. To further the purposes and goals of the treaty, it seems
likely that in the future courts will require adherence to the Convention.
Robert M. Hamilton


